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Dynamic Interference Minimization Routing Game
for On-Demand Cognitive Pilot Channel
Quanyan Zhu†, Zhou Yuan‡, Ju Bin Song§, Zhu Han‡, and Tamer Bas¸ar†
Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a distributed dynamic
routing algorithm for secondary users (SUs) to minimize their
interference with the primary users (PUs) in multi-hop cognitive
radio (CR) networks. We use the medial axis with a relaxation
factor as a reference path which is contingent on the states of
the PUs. Along the axis, we construct a hierarchical structure
for multiple sources to reach cognitive pilot channel (CPC) base
stations. We use a temporal and spatial dynamic non-cooperative
game to model the interactions among SUs as well as their
influences from PUs in the multi-hop structure of the network.
A multi-stage fictitious play learning is used for distributed
routing in multi-hop CR networks. We obtain a set of mixed
(behavioral) Nash equilibrium strategies of the dynamic game
in closed form by backward induction. The proposed algorithm
minimizes the overall interference and the average packet delay
along the routing path from SU nodes to CPC base stations in
an optimal and distributed manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary users (PUs) directly affect the spectrum op-
portunities available for the secondary users (SUs). As a
consequence, it results in the time-varying wireless channel
conditions and the dynamic network topology in multi-hop
cognitive radio (CR) networks [1]–[3]. Recently, the cognitive
pilot channel (CPC) has been suggested to provide frequency
and geographical information to SUs, assisting them in sensing
and accessing the spectrum [4]–[6]. As a result, the SUs
can improve their performance and avoid scanning the entire
spectrum to identify the spectrum holes and available PUs. The
on-demand CPC transmits the information only at the request
of a SU terminal. The on-demand CPC including both an
uplink and a downlink channel enables a wider range of CPC-
based applications in addition to the retrieval of the information
about operators, radio access technologies, and frequency lists.
To establish an effective CPC network, a multi-hop distributed
CR network scheme is required [3], [6]. The main existing
work in this area has focused on the information contents that
CPCs can convey, as well as on the implementation aspects
of the channels. To the best of our knowledge, no work has
been done to investigate an optimal dynamic routing scheme
for the on-demand CPC to route requests and deliver the CPC
information.
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Due to the dynamic interception of frequency channels by
PUs, SU networks should dynamically update their routing
paths. Although a few distributed routing algorithms have been
suggested for multi-hop CR networks [7], [8], it is imperative
to study an effective, dynamic and intelligent routing scheme in
CR networks that considers the time-varying channel states and
minimizes the interference not only over the routing path but
also over a long time horizon. In [9], a network formation game
algorithm has been studied for multi-hop CDMA networks in
which wireless users attempt to connect to the base station
via other users in the cellular network. The routing scheme is
based on a spatial dynamic game in which each user optimizes
the multi-stage interference along the path. In this paper, we
consider a similar dynamic routing game framework for the
application to multi-hop CR networks. Given the time-varying
nature of the PUs, we investigate a spatially and temporally
dynamic game framework which takes into account the state
variation of the PUs as well as the multi-stage property of the
CR networks.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a distributed
and optimal dynamic multi-hop network routing scheme for
the on-demand CPCs. We consider a CR network comprised
of PUs and SUs. The SUs form multi-hop hierarchal levels to
the CPC base stations and their performance is based on the
location of PUs and their states. In this work, we use thresholds
to separate the SUs logically into different layers and allow SUs
at each level to play a game against other users by choosing the
optimal route. In simulations, we observe that with the presence
of a PU, the SUs deviate from their original routes to avoid
collisions with the PU. The proposed algorithm minimizes the
interference with PUs and packet delay along the routing path.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model, and the game-theoretical model for
the CPC network routing is described in Section III. In Section
IV, we analyze the dynamic game and characterize the mixed
Nash equilibrium in a recursive form. In addition, we devise an
algorithm based on the fictitious play learning for the dynamic
multi-hop network routing game. The simulation results are
described and analyzed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In CR networks with the presence of PUs who constantly in-
tercept frequency channels, the multi-hop routing of SUs needs
to be made dynamic, distributed and efficient to reduce their
total interference with the PUs. We assume that SU nodes are
capable of acquiring the knowledge of the channel conditions
and their neighboring relays. SUs dynamically form routing
patterns and allocate transmission channels in the spectrum
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Fig. 1. A snapshot of the proposed dynamic multi-hop network formation for
the on-demand CPC on a frequency channel m1.
holes of the CR networks. Unlike multi-channel multi-radio
schemes, which operate on one channel at a time, multi-hop CR
networks can switch frequency channels on a per-packet basis.
In this paper, we consider the scenario in which the network
relays are CR SU nodes and the data is relayed from source
nodes to CPC base stations. We assume that the data format of
the on-demand CPC channel is determined, and consequently,
the bandwidth of a frequency channel is fixed for every SUs.
Let G = (N , E) be a topology graph for a multi-hop CR
network, where N = {n1, . . . , nN} is a set of N SU nodes
including the source SU nodes and relay SU nodes; and E =
{e1, . . . , eE} is a set of E links connecting the SUs and the relay
nodes. In addition, we let M = {m1, . . . ,mK} be a set of K
PUs and K be the set of CPC channels. We assume that the
set of frequency channels is identical to the set of PUs. In the
network routing problem, we assume that the set N is known,
but we need to determine a set of E links that optimizes the
network utilities (to be discussed in Section III). A SU node,
ni ∈ N , establishes a link with its neighboring nodes. Each
PU mk ∈ M is associated with a channel, which can be in
either an occupied or an unoccupied state. Let Sk,mk ∈ M,
be the set of channel states of PU mk. A system state s =
[sk]mk∈M ∈ S :=
∏K
k=1 Sk is a collection of individual states
of each primary channel mk.
We consider that the CR network with SUs and relay nodes
can be separated into a hierarchical structure [9] using the
medial axis [10] as a reference path as shown in Fig. 1.
Unlike [10], particular physical channel conditions, such as
delay constraints and spatial PUs’ footprints, are required for
multi-hop CR networks. A SU has to connect to a CPC
base station to request the CPC information through CR relay
nodes in multi-hop CR networks. Even though the SUs can
be geographically distributed over the network, we can view
the source nodes as nodes residing at the initial level 1. We
let L(s) = {1, 2, · · · , L(s)} be a set of hierarchical levels
at state s, comprising a total of L(s) levels with the first
layer consisting of the source SUs and the terminal layer
L(s) consisting of nodes that directly connect to CPC base
stations. We define the medial axis between two PUs as the
curve that describes the geographical points associated with
SUs where the lowest power from PUs is perceived. We assume
that each SU node is capable of sensing PUs and learning their
footprints. The information of the footprint of PUs is supposed
to be delivered to all SU nodes by flooding at the initialization
of the SU network. SU nodes dynamically learn the pattern of
the PUs’ footprint. Denote by A the medial axis and let NMSA be
the set of nodes on the medial axis A. We use the medial axis
A as the reference path along which the relay nodes between
source nodes and CPC base stations are separated into L(s)
hierarchical levels. We suggest a relaxation factor, ω = ϑ/r,
where r is the radius of the canonical circle around the axis A
and the parameter ϑ is chosen between 0 and 1. The relaxation
factor allows us to increase the area around medial axis and
consequently enlarge the area of SU nodes deployed in the
network. Similarly, we use N rSA to denote set of nodes in the
relaxed area.
In an on-demand CPC scheme, each CPC base station can
convey the statistics on the availability of idle frequency chan-
nels to the SU nodes to assist them in updating their spectrum
knowledge. SU nodes access the nearest CPC base station to
request the information. In our framework, we include the set
of SUs N rSA in the set N , among which we determine the set
of links E to connect SUs to CPCs. The remaining set N rSA\N
is the set of relay nodes along the medial axis that are capable
of transmitting packets in a multi-hop fashion.
III. GAME THEORY MODEL OF MULTI-HOP NETWORK
In this section, we describe a stochastic multi-stage network
routing game defined by Ξ = {Ξh(s)}s∈S,h∈L(s), which is a
set of games indexed by state s and hierarchy level h. Suppose
the network maintains the same hierarchy structure at each
state, then Ξ can be viewed as a matrix of games whose row
indicates a spatial network routing game Ξ(s) at a particular
state s and whose column is a temporal or state collection
of games at the same level h if at each state the network
has the same hierarchical separation. The network formation
game Ξ(s) at a given state s is well defined by a sequence of
games {Ξh(s)}h=1,··· ,L(s), where Ξh(s) is a game at level h
and state s. Each SU can access an idle PU’s channel only
when it is free. Let Pk : Sk × Sk → [0, 1] be the state
transition law of PU channel mk on Sk. Since the transition
probabilities between states x, y ∈ S are only controlled by
the PUs, the stationary distribution pi = [pis]s∈S of the Markov
chain (Sk,Pk), which we assume to exist, is independent of
the actions of the SUs. Let Hl, l ∈ L(s), be the set of SUs that
belong to the level l. It is clear that the sets Hl are mutually
exclusive and ∪l∈L(s)Hl = N .
Denote by li ∈ L(s) the level where user ni resides. To
find a multi-hop connection to the CPC channel, user ni needs
to find a node to connect to at the next level li + 1. In this
paper, the chosen node (ni, li + 1) can potentially yield an
optimal path with minimum payoff leading to a connection to
the destination. Let the set Nl(s) denote the nodes that are
available for connection at the next level to a node at level l
at a particular state s. If li = L(s), we let Nli = K. Hence,
(ni, li + 1) is a node chosen by ni at the next level from
the action set Nli(s) available to node (ni, li). By default, we
define (ni, li) := ni.
The local stage payoff to user ni is ui(s, (ni, li +
1), (n−i, li+1)) : S×N
|Hli |
li
→ R. It is an instantaneous payoff
at the local stage li which depends on the local actions of all
users at the level li. As a convention, we use n−i := Hli\{ni}
to denote the set of users other than ni at the level li and
(n−i, li + 1) := {(nj , li + 1) : nj ∈ Hli\{ni}} to mean the
set of actions by the set of users n−i. The coupling among
the utility functions ui induces a noncooperative environment
in which user ni competes with other user n−i to achieve
optimal utilities.
In the multi-hop CR networks, spectrum occupancy is
location-dependent, and therefore, along a multi-hop path,
available spectrum channels may be different at each relay node
[8]. If the surrounding PUs are highly active, their availability
for communications duration becomes meager for SU nodes,
resulting in long routing delay in CR networks. Hence, we
consider the queueing delay in the payoff function of the
dynamic game. If a PU frequently intercepts the channels,
the channels under current use need to be switched to other
unoccupied channels and this switching time is added to the
processing delay. In addition, if PUs intensively occupy all
channels for a long time, SU nodes have no idle frequency
channels and, consequently, re-routing delay is increased and
results in more packet delay. The expected total packet delay τi
perceived at SU node ni is defined by the Pollaczek-Khinchin
formula for the M/G/1 queueing system as follows [11]:
τi(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li))
=
λ(ni,li)(s)X
2
(ni,li)(s)
2(1− ρ(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li)))
+X(ni,li)(s),
(1)
where λ(ni,li)(s) is the state-dependent arrival rate of pack-
ets from nodes at level li seen at the node chosen by
ni and ρ(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li)) = λ(ni,li)(s)/µ(ni,li)(s) =
λ(ni,li)(s)X(ni,li)(s), where µ(ni,li)(s) is the service time at
the node (ni, li). X(ni,li) is the mean service time per packet
at the chosen node and X2(ni,li)(s) is the expected variance
of X(ni,li). The coupling between transmitting nodes at level
li is evident from (1). When more nodes choose to connect to
the same node (ni, li) as node ni does, they will experience
more delay as the arrival rate λ(ni,li) increases.
Each node ni calculates its payoff ui(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li)) of
connecting to (ni, li) given by
ui(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li)) = τi(s, (ni, li), (n−i, li)). (2)
The degree of freedom of user ni’s choice is constrained by the
set Nli . Given a state s, a user aims to optimize his long-term
payoff along his path to a CPC base station rather than merely
to optimize his local myopic payoff ui at level li. Denote by
P(ni, l), li < l ≤ L(s), the path of a node ni to a node at
level l. It is clear that when l = L(s), P(ni, l) refers to the
path from a SU to the destination and, by default, when l =
li + 1, P(ni, li + 1) is a link from ni to the node (ni, li +
1). For example, the path P(ni, li + 2) is composed of two
links: P(ni, li+1) and P((ni, li+1), li+2). The user ni can
only have control over the link P(ni, li + 1) while the link
P((ni, li + 1), li + 2) and the links onwards are controlled by
other nodes.
Let Ui(s, (ni, l), (n−i, l)) : S ×
∏
l′∈{li,li+1,··· ,l}
N
|Hl′ |
l′ →
R denote the path utility attained by the user ni at state s over
the path P(ni, l). Due to the delay, interference and coupling,
the utility also depends on the path by other users. Following
the convention, we use (ni, l) := {((ni, l′), l′ + 1) : li ≤ l′ ≤
l − 1} to denote the path of user ni up to the level l and use
(n−i, l) := {((nj , l′), l′ + 1) : nj ∈ Hli\{ni}, li ≤ l
′ ≤ l− 1}
to denote the actions by other users up to the level l along
their chosen path P(n−i, l). The goal of a SU ni is to attain a
connection to a CPC base station with optimal utility along the
path. The path utility Ui(s, (ni, L(s)), (n−i, L(s))) of a user
ni over the path P(ni, L(s)) can be expressed as a sum of
stage utilities as follows:
Ui(s, (ni, L(s)), (n−i, L(s)))
=
L(s)∑
l=li
u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l + 1), (n−i, l + 1)),
(3)
where and u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l+1), (n−i, l+1)) denotes the payoff
to node (ni, l) when it chooses directly the node (ni, l+1) in
the next level.
At a fixed state s, a SU ni needs to choose an optimal path
that achieves the optimal payoff. However, he can only choose
from Nli(s) his next hop connection (ni, li+1) and leaves the
future choices made by the node that he connects to. Let U∗i (s)
be the optimal payoff. The path utility (3) can be rewritten as
U∗i (s, (n−i, L(s))
:= min
(ni,li+1)∈Nli (s)
L(s)∑
l=li
u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l+ 1), (n−i, l + 1))
= min
(ni,li+1)∈Nli (s)
ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))
+
L(s)∑
l=li+1
u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l+ 1), (n−i, l + 1))
= min
(ni,li+1)∈Nli (s)
ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))
+ U∗(ni,l+1)
(
s, (n−(ni,l+1), L(s))
)
= min
(ni,li+1)
ui(s, (ni, l+ 1)) + U
∗
(ni,l+1)
(s, (n(ni,l+1), L(s))).
(4)
On the right-hand side of (4), U∗(ni,l+1) can be seen as
the payoff-to-go and ui is the current instantaneous payoff
to optimize. A solution to (4) can be found using backward
induction, where we start with the nodes at the last level and
then propagate the solution to level li. Since every user on
the same level with ni optimizes his utility in the same way,
the best responses of (3) to other nodes on the same level
can lead to a Nash equilibrium where no node finds it to
its benefit to deviate from its chosen action. However, the
existence of Nash equilibrium for the game at a particular
level is not guaranteed. To ensure the existence, we adopt
mixed strategies in which the users at level li randomize
over Nli(s). Let fi,l(s) = {f(ni,l′) : li ≤ l′ ≤ l} denote
a mixed strategy of ni at a given state s up to level l. It
is clear that when l = li, then fi,l(s) only contains the
mixed strategies of node ni. For l > li, fi,l(s) comprises of
sets of mixed strategies along the path up to (ni, l). We let
Fl := {fi,l′(s), ni ∈ Hli , li ≤ l
′ ≤ l} the set of user strategies
at level l and F−i,l := {fj,l′(s), nj ∈ Hli\{ni}, li ≤ l′ ≤ l}.
Let F := {fi,l(s), ni ∈ Hl, l ∈ L(s)}.
A user ni chooses a mixed strategy to minimize his expected
total payoff of (3), i.e.,
U i(s,F) =
L(s)∑
l=li
Efi,l,F−i,lu(ni,l)(s, (ni, l + 1), (n−i, l+ 1)).
(5)
Following (6), we have
U
∗
i (s, fi,liF−i,li)
:= min
fi,li
Efi,li ,F−i,li
ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))
+ U
∗
(ni,l+1)
(
s,F(ni,l+1),l+1
)
.
(6)
Similarly, the game with expected payoff can also be solved
by backward induction. At each state, a matrix game needs to
be solved and each user ni generates a mixed strategy on their
action set. Hence, what we will be encountering here is a Nash
equilibrium in behavioral strategies.
IV. DYNAMIC MULTI-HOP ROUTING
A user ni faces a long-term payoff when the cognitive
radio system evolves on the state space S. Let {st, t ∈ Z}
be a sequence of states indexed by time t. Let vi(s) be
the value function of user ni when ni starts in state s, i.e.,
s0 = s. We consider mixed (behavioral) stationary strategies
for user ni that are only dependent on their current state.
Denote by fi(s, ai) the probability of user ni choosing a
next level node ai ∈ Nli at state s ∈ S. The vector
fi(s) ∈ [0, 1]
|Nli | is the state dependent mixed strategy given
by fi(s) = [fi(s, ai)]ai∈Nli . Let Fi(s) denote the set of all
such strategies, i.e.,
Fi(s) =

fi(s) ∈ [0, 1]
|Nli |
∑
ai∈Nli
fi(s, ai) = 1

 . (7)
Let Vi be the long-term infinite horizon path utility function
which depends on fi(s), ni ∈ Hli ; it is given by
Vi(s, fi(s), f−i(s))
=
∞∑
t=0
β
t
Es,fi(s),f−i(s)[Ui(s, (ni, L(s)), (n−i, L(s)))|s0 = s]
(8)
=
∞∑
t=0
L(s)∑
l=li
β
t
Es,fi(s),f−i(s)[u(ai,l)(s, (ni, l + 1), (n−i, l + 1))|s0 = s],
where 0 < β < 1 is a discounting factor. The value function is
yielded by the optimization over the long term utility Vi given
the other users’ mixed stationary strategies f∗−i(s),
vi(s) = min
fi∈F(s)
Vi(s, fi(s), f
∗
−i(s)), ∀ni ∈ Hli . (9)
Since the utilities ui are bounded, Vi is bounded and
the interchange of expectation and summation is possible by
Fubini’s Theorem [12]. Assume L(s) = L for all s ∈ S. We
can rewrite (8) as
Vi(s, fi,li(s),F−i,li(s))
=
L∑
l=li
∞∑
t=0
β
t
Es,fi,l(s),F−i,l(s)[u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l + 1), (n−i, l + 1))|s0 = s]
=
∞∑
t=0
β
t
Es,fi,li (s),F−i,li (s)
[ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))|s0 = s]
+
L∑
l=li+1
∞∑
t=0
β
t
Es,fi,l(s),F−i,l(s)[u(ni,l)(s, (ni, l + 1), (n−i, l + 1))|s0 = s].
Denote by Wi(s, fi(s),F−i,li(s)) the local infinite-horizon
utility function, i.e.,
Wi(s, fi,li(s)),F−i,li(s))
=
∞∑
t=0
βtEs,fi,li (s),F−i,li (s)[ui(s, (ni, li+1), (n−i, li+1))|s0 = s].
(10)
Hence, (8) can be rewritten as
Vi(s, fi,li(s),F−i,li(s)) = Wi(s, fi,li(s),F−i,li(s))
+
L∑
l=li+1
W(ni,l)(s, f(ni,l)(s),F(−(ni,l),l)(s)).
(11)
The payoff function Vi has two components. One is the local
infinite time horizon payoff and the other is the off-to-go
infinite time horizon payoff. Both components depend on the
strategy made by user ni.
A. Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction
We intend to find the Nash equilibrium of the game defined
by Ξ with the utility function in (8).
Definition 1: Let Φl be the level l game denoted by Φl :=
〈Nl, {Vi, ni ∈ Nl}, {Ai, ni ∈ Nl},P,S〉, where Vi is the
utility defined in (8) and Ai = Al = Nl = Hl+1, ∀ni ∈ Hl
is the action space for users ni ∈ Nl. The mixed stationary
strategy F∗ is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies ∀ni ∈ Nli ,
Vi(s,F
∗
li
(s)) ≥ Vi(s, fi(s),F
∗
−i,li(s)), ∀fi,li (s) ∈ Fi(s).
The sequence of {Φl}l∈L admits a mixed stationary Nash
strategy F∗ if for all l ∈ L, F∗l is a mixed stationary Nash
strategy for the game Φl.
The value function vi is the payoff at the Nash equilibrium,
i.e., vi(s) = Vi(s,F∗li(s)). In short-hand notation, we use
f
∗
i ∈ arg NEi{Vi(s,Fli(s))}, vi = NEi{Vi(s,Fli(s))},
to denote the Nash equilibrium and its corresponding value
function respectively. Using induction, we have the following
result.
Theorem 1: Let ri,li(s) = NEi{ui(s, (ni, li+1), (n−i, li+
1))}, ni ∈ Hli and ri,L be its vector form with each entry
corresponding to one state. Also let P = [Pss′ ]s,s′∈S be the
transition matrix. At the last stage, li = L, we obtain
fi,li(s) ∈ arg NEi{ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))}
vi = [I− βP]
−1
ri,L,
where ri,L(s) = NEi{ui(s, (ni, L), (n−i, L))}. If K = {K0}
is a singleton set, then ri,L(s) = ui(s,K0, · · · ,K0). The
TABLE I
THE SKELETON OF THE PROPOSED DYNAMIC ROUTING ALGORITHM
1: Global procedure
Initialize network
Define ∂R, A, ω, N r
SA
Update map
2: Local procedure
Start game Ξ(s)
SUs learn the mixed strategies by fictitious play at each level
End game Ξ(s)
3: Packet transmission procedure
4: Complete forwarding the request of CPC information
5: Acquire information from CPC
6: Go to update map if new information is obtained
mixed stationary strategies F∗ of the game Ξ can be found
recursively by
f
∗
i,li
(s) ∈ arg NEi{ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))
+v(ni,li+1)(s)}, ni ∈ Hli .
The optimal payoff to a node ni playing f∗i,li(s) yields a value
function
vi = [I− βP]
−1
ri,li , ∀ni ∈ Hli , (12)
where
ri,li(s) =


NEi{ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))
+v(ni,li+1)(s)} if 1 ≤ li ≤ L− 1,
NEi{ui(s, (ni, li + 1), (n−i, li + 1))} if li = L.
The recursion involves finding ri,li and f∗i (s) through the value
functions of nodes at the next level.
B. Algorithm Description
We propose a distributed dynamic routing algorithm for
the SUs to minimize their interference with the PUs. Each
node improves its current payoffs and takes into account the
previous payoffs. Summarized in Table I, the algorithm starts
with a global procedure defining the set of hierarchies from
the sources to the destinations. In this step, we initialize the
boundary, PU footprint map, and the medial axis and they are
dynamically updated whenever the SUs acquire the new system
knowledge from CPCs. Once the source to the destination pair
is defined, the set of N rSA along the medial axis is defined
as a reference routing path with the relaxation factor ω. The
second step of the algorithm is a local procedure in which each
user calculates his payoff and selects the best routing node at
the next level with the minimum delay. The node updates its
mixed strategies by fictitious play [13] until the game converges
to its Nash equilibrium. We use fictitious play at each stage
l ∈ L to find the mixed Nash equilibrium at that level. After
SUs acquire the state information from CPCs, the nodes update
map including the PUs’ map and topology information and the
set of nodes NMSA and N rSA.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results of a routing formation
from 4 source SU nodes to the nearest CPC base station within
N rSA. In Fig. 2, we show two PUs, two CPC base stations,
4 source SUs, and 10 SU relay nodes are in N rSA within a
2 km × 2 km area. We assume that the PUs do not vary
their configurations or footprints. The SU source nodes are 1,
2, 3, and 4 at the first hierarchy level. SU relay nodes have
their own random arrival time and service time. The arrival
time depends on routing results at previous hierarchy levels
due to the dynamic utility functions. The nodes update their
mixed strategies at each iteration. The optimal action taken
at the iteration k determines the vector Ui at the following
iteration and is used to update the empirical frequencies. The
SUs form the current belief of a user on other users’ actions
from the empirical learning and select the best response action
in the next iteration. This iterative process continues until the
empirical frequencies converge to the Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 2 depicts 4 SU nodes, i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 4, at the first level
and 4 SU relay nodes, i.e., 5, 6, 7, and 8, at the next level. Fig.
5 shows the convergence of the mixed strategies vs. iterations
at SU node 4 at the first hierarchy level. The node 4 updates its
mixed strategies by increasing or decreasing the probabilities
on selecting nodes 5, 6, 7, and 8, as the data of the play history
accumulates. The mixed strategies finally converge to 0.9, 0.2,
0.01, and 0.01 for connecting to nodes 5, 6, 7, and 8 within 60
iterations. Therefore, node 4 selects node 7 to transmit packets
within a reasonable iteration time.
The results of the dynamic routing algorithm for densely
deployed SU networks are shown in Fig.4. There are 3,000
nodes and relays randomly deployed within a 1.6 km by 2.0 km
area in Fig. 3. Two PUs exist respectively at (-0.3, 0) with the
coverage radius of 0.5 km and at (0.6. -0.2) with the coverage
radius of 0.2 km. The arrival rate and the processing rate for
all SU nodes are randomly chosen. Fig. 4 shows two pairs of
routing results from SU 2 to CPC BS 1 and SU1 to CPC BS 2.
In this simulation, all SU nodes have 1 W transmission power
with the interference range of 0.15 km and a path loss factor
α = 2.5. The results of the proposed routing algorithm with
ω = 0.7 is compared with results of Dijkstra’s algorithm and
medial axis (MA) routing as shown in Fig. 4. The blue lines
(3) are routes using Dijkstra’s algorithm, and the black lines
(1) represent the routes using our algorithm. The red lines (2)
show the routes using MA algorithm. Intuitively, the Dijkstra’s
algorithm provides higher interference with PU networks than
the proposed algorithm along overall routing paths and MA
routing algorithm provides much higher delay because of traffic
jam on medial axis path.
Fig. 6 shows the results of interference comparison between
different algorithms. The x-axis represents the distance be-
tween the source and destination and y-axis is the normalized
interference. The interference with PUs is calculated using
the interference temperature model. The average delay results
versus distance of routing paths is also shown in Fig. 7. From
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we can find that our proposed algorithm
avoids congestion and minimizes delay at a cost of a slight
increase in the interference compared to the MA algorithm.
Our algorithm also provides robust routing results by hierarchy
level network routing, which forwards packets to the nearest
CPC base station.
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Fig. 2. Results of the dynamic routing algo-
rithm with 4 SU nodes and 10 relays randomly
deployed in N r
SA
at t = t
′
. ω = 0.7 and
random U applied for every nodes. The arrowed
solid lines are final routing results, i.e. Nash
equilibrium for each SU nodes.
?????????????? ???
??????????
????????????????
????????
Fig. 3. The network topology for 3,000 SU
nodes and relays (dot) randomly deployed in the
presence of 2 PUs.
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Fig. 4. Results of routing for the proposed algo-
rithm in comparison with Dijkstra’s algorithm
and MA routing. ω = 0.7 and random U
deployed for every SU nodes.
Fig. 5. Convergence of the mixed strategies vs.
iteration time of node 4 at the first hierarchy
level in Fig. 2.
Fig. 6. The normalized interference results ver-
sus distance of routing paths for different algo-
rithms.
Fig. 7. The normalized delay results versus
distance of routing paths for comparing with
different routing algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a dynamic and distributed
routing algorithm for multi-hop cognitive radio networks. The
routing algorithm minimizes the interference with the PUs
from multiple pairs of SU nodes to CPC base stations. We
have used the medial axis scheme with the relaxation factor
as a reference path in the global procedure. In the local
distributed procedure of the algorithm, we have used fictitious
play learning to find a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
dynamic routing game in the multi-hop CR network. We have
shown that the equilibrium can be found in closed form by
backward induction. In simulations, we have observed that the
mixed strategy of each SU node using the learning algorithm
converges within short iterations. The algorithm significantly
reduces interference with PU networks and achieves low packet
delay from source nodes to CPC base stations.
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